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Case-Management Criminal Mediation Offers Promise
But Requires Caution
by Maureen E. Laflin
Mediating criminal cases is no longer a vague concept, limited
to only juveniles, non-serious adult criminal cases, and so-called
"victim-offender" programs. From major murders to average possession cases, an increasing number of judges and attorneys are
turning to mediation as a method of resolving felony cases.
This is an exciting time, as we are on the cusp of a significant
change in how we resolve criminal cases. Many in the legal community expressed surprise when the judge in the well-publicized
Florida patricide trial of Derek and Alex King appointed a mediator to negotiate punishment for the boys after rejecting the jury
verdicts of second degree murder against them both.' Mediating
violent felony cases is happening and will continue to happen
because success is contagious.
The field of criminal mediation has grown organically based
on requests from either the assigned judge or the parties. During
this growth, little attention has been given to the qualifications
for criminal mediators. Criminal mediators have no prescribed
training or certification requirements. Thus far, extensive criminal experience and expense seem to be the deciding factors in
selecting a person to conduct criminal mediations.
In Idaho, judges conduct the majority of the case-management
mediations. Judges offer several advantages. They are generally
cost-free, as they are already under full-time public employment
contracts; they have the support of their colleagues; they often
have subject matter expertise from previously trying or presiding
over a significant number of criminal cases; and they are interested and willing to mediate criminal cases. The use of judges, however, raises concerns regarding lack of training and the use of a
highly evaluative style which may result in unduly pressuring
defendants into waiving their constitutionally protected rights.
Judicial mediators must recognize the potential coercive effect
their presence may have on defendants or their counsel.
Prosecutors already wield nearly absolute power in the criminal
arena and exert that power in the plea bargaining setting. Some
have argued that in the plea context, coerciveness is so pervasive
that it sometimes results in innocent people pleading guilty?
Judicial mediators need to be cautious not to unduly add the
power of the robe into the equation.' Participants in the mediation
process want the judicial mediator to perform multiple tasks,
which at times may conflict. The judicial mediator is expected to
assist the participants with a risk analysis, to bring a voice of objective reason to the table, to protect the defendant from coercive tactics, to persuade the participants to settle, and to preserve the
integrity of the mediation process and ultimately the criminal justice system. They want the judicial mediator to determine when
one side or the other is not acting in good faith and to either get
them to change their bargaining position or to call the mediation.'
Although judicial mediators may not perceive their actions as
coercive, they cannot under-estimate their influence on the settlement process and the weight their "judicious recommendation"
carries and maintain that they are simply accommodating the

parties' desires.' Parties and attorneys generally perceive a judge as
a person of integrity, as an impartial and fair mediator with a
background of experience in their type of case, and as an administrator of justice from whom they can expect a judicious recommendation for settlement.", And that is usually what they get. As
one judge noted, "[bccausc of their cxpcricncc as adjudicators,
judicial mediators tend to be more evaluative than facilitative,
that is, they are generally more willing to share their evaluation of
the merits or value of a claim."'
As Professor Riskin so aptly noted when he wrote about evaluative mediators, "[T]he parties should understand that once
they involve a third party, and allow that 'neutral' to give an opinion on the merits, that determination will almost always have a
powerful impact on all further negotiations."" This is especially
problematic in the criminal arena. While in civil cases, some
judges view their role as listening, probing, and exploring each
parties' views and thei fashioning and presenting to the disputants his or her "reasonable settlement," " some argue that
judges in the criminal context should refrain from being strongly
evaluative out of concern that the judge's opinion will unduly
sway and intimidate the defendant into pleading guilty and waiving his constitutional rights." Thus, while judges think, "lawyers
may value the judge's opinion on the merits of their cases and
appreciate a thoughtful, analytical, and impartial assessment of
the case for settlement purposes,"" the power of the robe can be
coercive even though the mediator is not the assigned judge.'3
While criminal mediations are ostensibly voluntary, defendants and their counsel may fear reprisal from the court for failure to participate and ultimately settle. 4 Although the "fear" may
not result in actual complaints to the court, the apprehension is
real, and courts must be proactive to minimize or allay the concerns. One federal judge who periodically serves as a settlement
conferencing judge, generally starts each session telling the parties
that the process is voluntary, that the session will not be an "arm
twisting" session, and that he has "concerns about the notion of
criminal settlement conferences, the potential for intimidation,
and the defendants need to be free from even the feeling of coercion." ' 5 Is that enough of a disclaimer? The answer is not clear.
What is clear is that such statements alert counsel and the defendant to the issue of coercion.
Some argue that the presence of competent counsel serves as
a security blanket or buffer, which protects defendants from coercive intimidation; however, the strength of this assertion is
dependent on the caliber of defense counsel. "The belief that the
defendant can walk out of this "voluntary process" underestimates the control and power judicial mediators exert. Whether
mediation is truly mandatory versus voluntary depends on one's
perspective. Thus, while judges may deny that mediation in a particular situation is mandatory, defense counsel understand a
request from the bench. As one of the defense attorneys in the
King brothers' mediation noted, "The judge asked tis-he basi[hr Advocate + November 2004 15
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cally ordered mediation between the parties."' It is critical that
the growth of criminal mediation involves a truly voluntary
process and not an implicit requirement leaving defense counsel
in conflict between abiding by the wishes of the client and complying with the not-so-subtle messages from the court.
In many ways, criminal case-management mediation is the
logical exteision of a failed plea-bargaining process. If a neutral
third party can help break an impasse without exerting extensive
control over the outcome, criminal mediation presents a positive
addition to the dispute resolution processes. If the process simply
allows a judicial mediator to clear a calendar by strong-arming a
defendant into accepting a plea, then the process must stop.
Judicial mediators thus need to be trained in mediation and
mindful of the power they exert over the participants in the criminal process. The judge-mediator sits on a powder keg of rights
and liberties that must not be cavalierly or even inadvertently
ignited. The defendant's life and liberty are at stake in the criminal context. Judicial mediators need to proceed cautiously and
not wait for complaints to arise. A proactive response to this burgeoning field is prudent.
As this process of assisted plea-bargaining takes root and
becomes an emerging reality in our criminal justice system, it
requires reflective consideration from prosecutors, defense counsel, the bench, and the ADR community.
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